

The Offense of Favoritism in Public Procurement under Law No. 06/01 on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption

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Abstract

The offence of favoritism, as provided for under Article 26 of Law No. 06/01 on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption which replaced Article 128 bis of the Penal Code repealed by the Anti-Corruption Law consists in a public official granting unjustified advantages to others in the context of public procurement in its broad sense, with the intent to violate the legislative and regulatory provisions governing such contracts. This offence is typically conceived as involving an offer from the beneficiary and acceptance by the public official of the benefit to be obtained in the event of being awarded the contract. In other words, the public official grants undue and unjustified advantages to a third party (without obtaining them for himself), particularly by deliberately favoring one of the candidates. It is a formal offence, established even in the absence of any resulting harm, and is punishable under Algerian law.

Keywords: favoritism, public procurement, criminalization rules, penalty rules, anti-corruption law.

Introduction

The offence of favoritism, or the granting of unjustified and undue advantages to others in public procurement, constitutes a deviation by a public official from the proper performance of his duties in order to deliberately favor the private interest of one of the candidates at the expense of the public interest. This leads, on the one hand, to a loss of citizens' trust in the fairness and integrity of the State, and, on the other hand, to the impairment of the proper functioning of the public administration. This situation has prompted the criminal legislator to intervene in order to criminalize and suppress such conduct with the aim of putting an end to it. Given that public procurement represents the legal mechanism granted to public administrations for the management of public funds, it has become a fertile ground for corruption in all its forms. Consequently, the criminal legislator intervened to criminalize the offence of favoritism

in the field of public procurement under Article 26, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Corruption Law, after repealing Article 128 bis, paragraph 1, which had previously provided for the same offence. The former provision linked the notion of a public official to those acting on behalf of the State, local authorities, or the bodies specified in Article 119 of the repealed Penal Code. For the establishment of the offence of favoritism, the Algerian legislator, under Article 26, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Corruption Law, presumes that the perpetrator is a public official or a person in a similar position, legally authorized to conclude, endorse, review, or supervise a contract, public procurement, agreement, or amendment on behalf of the State or its public entities. In such capacity, the official exploits his administrative position to deliberately favor one of the candidates without lawful justification, granting unjustified advantages. This is conceived as involving an offer by the beneficiary and acceptance by the public official, who may also obtain a benefit. This occurs while taking into account the newly introduced provisions of the Anti-Corruption Law concerning investigative and prosecutorial techniques aimed at detecting such offences.

This raises the following question: **to what extent is the criminal policy adopted by the Algerian legislator effective and efficient in addressing the offence of favoritism in public procurement under the Anti-Corruption Law?**

- What are the rules of criminalization governing this offence?
- Is the punitive policy and the applicable sanctions sufficiently deterrent?

These questions will be addressed in this research paper according to the following plan:

First: The concept of public procurement under the Anti-Corruption Law

Second: The rules of criminalization of the offence of favoritism (elements of the offence)

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- 1- The offender (status of the perpetrator as a competent public official)
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First: The concept of public procurement under the Anti-Corruption Law

The field of public procurement is exposed to various forms of corruption, due to its connection with public office on the one hand and the significant financial allocations dedicated to it on the other, as well as the breadth of its scope and its dominance over the State's investment activities. This has led the criminal legislator to adopt an expansive definition of public procurement, not limiting it to the concept set out in Presidential Decree No. 15/247 of 16/09/2015 on the regulation of public procurement and public service delegations.

It also includes any contract, agreement, or amendment concluded by the administration with private law persons for the purpose of carrying out works or providing services in order to achieve public interest, in accordance with legally defined conditions. In this respect, the Algerian legislator was influenced by French law, particularly Article 432-14 of the French Penal Code, which has been broadly interpreted by the French Court of Cassation.¹

1- Public procurement: It is any written contract concluded for consideration by a public official or a person in a similar position with economic operators under legally defined conditions, for the purpose of carrying out works, supplying goods or services, or conducting studies on behalf of the contracting authority.²

2- The contract: It refers to commercial contracts concluded by the State, or by one of its public institutions or administrative bodies, with other legal persons or with another natural person, in accordance with the rules of administrative law, without the use of prerogatives of public authority.³

3- The agreement: It is a contract concluded by the State, or by public institutions or administrative bodies, with a legal or natural person for the purpose of carrying out works or services on behalf of the contracting authority, provided that the allocated amount does not reach the threshold of a public contract. It is concluded under the same procedures applicable to public procurement, except for those relating to the method of award, control, and publicity.

4- The amendment (addendum): It is a contractual document attached to the public contract, concluded under specific procedures for the purpose of increasing or reducing services, modifying one or more clauses of the contract, or adding new services falling within its overall subject matter⁴, provided that it does not substantially modify the subject of the contract.

Second: The rules of criminalization relating to the offence of favoritism (elements of the offence)

Favoritism is defined as “the unjustified preference of one party over another in the provision of services in order to obtain certain benefits.”⁵ In the field of public procurement, it refers to “favoring one candidate for a public contract over another without legal justification and granting him unjustified advantages in order to achieve certain interests.” Favoritism is a

¹ Cour de cassation, Criminal Chamber, 17 February 2016, No. 15-85, p. 363.

² See: Article 2 of Presidential Decree No. 15/247 of 16/09/2015 on the regulation of public procurement and public service delegations.

³ Ali Khattab Rashid Tantawi, *The Brief in Administrative Law*, 1st ed., 2003, Dar Wael for Publishing and Distribution, Jordan, p. 416.

– See: Article 54 of the Algerian Civil Code.

⁴ See: Article 136 of the Public Procurement and Public Service Delegations Law.

⁵ Mohamed Ali Ibrahim Al-Khasba, *Financial and Administrative Corruption and Ways to Combat It*, working paper presented at the Third Arab Forum entitled: Mechanisms for Protecting Public Funds and Reducing Administrative Corruption, held in Rabat in May 2008, Kingdom of Morocco, 2009, p. 148.

traditional offence, addressed under Article 128 bis, paragraph 1 of the Penal Code, which was repealed by Article 26, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Corruption Law. It was criminalized to ensure equality between candidates for public contracts, to combat discrimination between economic operators, and to establish transparency in candidacy and procurement procedures.

Since the offence cannot be considered complete unless all its legal elements are present, the absence of any element necessarily results in the absence of the offence, and consequently there is no basis for punishment, as the elements of any crime form part of its very essence. It follows from Article 26, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Corruption Law that the offence of favoritism requires the existence of the following elements:

A/ The material element

It is understood from the provisions of Article 26, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Corruption Law that the material element of the offence is composed of three components:

1- The offender (status of the perpetrator as a competent public official):

This is the presumed status of the offender, namely a “public official.” It is a common element in most offences related to public procurement, as well as in other corruption offences committed by public officials. This status must exist at the time the offence is committed. If the perpetrator, at the time of concluding, endorsing, or reviewing the contract, was not a public official or a person in a similar position, or if this status ceased to exist due to dismissal or resignation, for example, he cannot be considered as having committed the offence of favoritism¹. However, he may still be held criminally liable under other offences such as fraud or deception.²

Accordingly, it is necessary to clarify the concept of “public official” under the Anti-Corruption Law, which defines it in Article 2, paragraph (b), drawing from Article 2(1) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, which Algeria ratified with reservations under Presidential Decree No. 04/128 dated 15/04/2004.³

It is noted that the Anti-Corruption Law has adopted an expanded definition of the concept of public official, including not only persons holding the status of public officials but also other categories considered as equivalent. This expansion reflects the Algerian legislator’s intent to close all possible avenues for the misuse of public office and the manipulation of public funds, with the aim of limiting and deterring all forms of corruption.

From the analysis of Article 2, paragraph (b) of the Anti-Corruption Law, the status of “public official” includes three categories:

First category: Position-based category:

This includes any person holding an executive, administrative, or judicial position, whether appointed or elected, permanent or temporary, paid or unpaid, regardless of rank or seniority, as well as any person holding a legislative or elected position within local elected assemblies.

Second category:

¹ Al-Arabi Belhaj, *Research and Memoirs in Law and Islamic Jurisprudence*, Vol. 2, 1st ed., 1996, Office of University Publications, Algeria, p. 435.

² See the provisions of Articles 242, 243, and 372 of the Algerian Penal Code.

³ Ahsan Bousquia, *The Brief in Special Criminal Law*, Vol. 2, 11th ed., 2011, Dar Houma for Publishing and Distribution, Algeria, p. 11.

This includes any person entrusted with a function or mandate within a public service, public body, public institution, or a mixed-capital entity, or any other institution providing a public service.

Third category: This includes any person who is considered equivalent to a public official under applicable legislation and regulations. This applies, in particular, to military and civilian personnel of national defense, as well as public officers (notary, judicial officer, auctioneer, and official translator).¹

It should be noted that, in addition to the requirement of being a public official or a person in a similar position, the perpetrator must also have jurisdiction over the relevant administrative act for the offence of favoritism to be established. In the absence of such jurisdiction, the offence does not exist, as the element of functional competence is not fulfilled.²

2- The act (criminal activity and conduct):

It consists of the commission of the punishable act, i.e., the outward manifestation of the offence in the external world³. The criminal conduct in the offence of favoritism is established when the perpetrator deliberately grants unjustified advantages to others, at the time of concluding, endorsing, or reviewing a contract, agreement, amendment, or public procurement, without complying with the legislative and regulatory provisions relating to freedom of access to public procurement, equality among candidates, and transparency of procedures.⁴

Accordingly, the criminal conduct of this offence is limited to three forms:⁵

Conclusion (award): According to Article 9 of the Anti-Corruption Law, it refers to the signing of a document in which the subject matter of the contract is set out, including the procedures, forms, and conditions required by law for approving a public contract, agreement, or amendment in violation of the legislative and regulatory provisions governing freedom of access, equality among candidates, and transparency of procedures. It should be noted that public procurement is concluded either through the principle of tendering, which constitutes the general rule, or through the negotiated procedure as an exception.

Endorsement (approval): This occurs after conclusion and is a procedure aimed at approving the contract and verifying its compliance with legal provisions. It is carried out by the Public Procurement Commission (the legal representative of the contracting authority).

Review (revision): This refers to the reconsideration of certain provisions of the contract whenever circumstances require it, and it mainly concerns pricing in cases of delay in execution.

¹Mohamed Sobhi Najm, *Explanation of the Algerian Penal Code – Special Part*, 2nd ed., 1990, Office of University Publications, Algeria, p. 97.

– Malika Hennan, *Corruption Crimes: Bribery, Embezzlement and Illicit Enrichment of the Public Official in Islamic Jurisprudence and Algerian Anti-Corruption Law: A Comparative Study with Some Arab Legislations*, New University Publishing House, Egypt, 2010, p. 50.

² Mahmoud Naguib Hosni, *Explanation of the Penal Code – Special Part*, Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiyya, Cairo, 1988, pp. 27...

³ Malika Hennan, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁴ Abdelali Hacha, *Mechanisms for Combating Administrative Corruption in Algeria*, PhD thesis in Law, Public Law specialization, University of Mohamed Khider – Biskra, 2012–2013, p. 112.

⁵ Mahmoud Lenkar, lectures delivered to Master students, Criminal Law specialization, Faculty of Law, University of 20 August 1955 – Skikda, 2014.

In order for the offence to be established, these three acts must constitute a violation of legislative and regulatory provisions, particularly those governing public procurement law, such as non-compliance with the legally prescribed deadlines allowing candidates to submit their bids, or failure to respect the announced criteria for selecting the beneficiary of the contract, etc. It should be noted that Article 26, paragraph 1 of the current Anti-Corruption Law has narrowed its scope of application, restricting criminalization to violations of legislative and regulatory provisions relating only to freedom of access to public procurement, equality between candidates, and transparency of procedures¹. These principles are also enshrined in Article 9 of the Anti-Corruption Law as well as in the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

3- The purpose of the act:

This refers to the subjective purpose in the mind of the offender, namely the intention to grant unjustified and undue advantages to others without personally benefiting from them. Therefore, the judiciary must establish this element in its ruling as part of the constitutive elements of the offence. It consists in the deliberate favoritism of one candidate not for the purpose of obtaining the best offer, but rather for reasons related to personal relationships or social considerations. In the absence of this purpose, the act constitutes merely a regulatory violation. It should be noted that it is not required for the beneficiary to actually obtain the undue advantages; it is sufficient that the breach and the intent exist, even if the result does not materialize (a formal offence)². Thus, the three aforementioned forms of criminal conduct are not sufficient alone to establish the material element of the offence of favoritism in public procurement unless they are accompanied by the purpose of deliberately granting unjustified advantages to others and favoring them over competitors. For example, intentionally inflating the technical or financial scoring of one candidate in an unjustified manner. However, it is required that the “other” party whether a natural or legal person be the beneficiary of these advantages and not the offender himself. If the offender is the one who benefits from the undue advantages, the legal characterization of the act changes and it becomes classified as bribery in public procurement.³

B/ The moral element (criminal intent)

It is not sufficient for the offence of favoritism that the material act alone is committed; it must also be carried out with knowledge and intent. Favoritism is an intentional offence requiring general intent (knowledge and will), in addition to specific intent consisting in granting unjustified advantages to others while being aware of their illegitimacy. This applies even if the perpetrator does not obtain any personal benefit and regardless of whether the act results in an increase in the cost borne by the public contracting authority. Thus, the offence may be established even in the absence of harm to the public treasury. It should also be noted that the motive is not taken into consideration.

The subjective element of the offence of favoritism may be inferred from the facts and surrounding circumstances, as well as from the full awareness of the breach of procedural rules,

¹ See the explanatory memorandum attached to Draft Law No. 11/15 amending and supplementing Law No. 06/01 on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption, Ministry of Justice, 2011, p. 02.

² Mahmoud Lenkar, op. cit.

³ Ahsan Bousquia, op. cit., p. 120.

or from the impossibility of ignorance thereof due to the nature of the position held by the offender. French case law has held that criminal intent in the offence of favoritism may be established on the basis that the offender has held elected or administrative functions for a long period, thereby possessing significant experience in the field of public procurement¹.

As with the material element, judges are required to establish and demonstrate the existence of both general and specific intent on the part of the offender, and to clarify the relationship between the committed acts and the criminal intention to act knowingly and deliberately. This must be done through all available means of proof, provided that the court explicitly states in its judgment convicting the accused of favoritism the existence of criminal intent, so as to enable the Supreme Court to exercise its control over the correct application of the law and ensure the absence of any contradiction between the established facts and the conclusions reached. It should be noted that Article 26, paragraph 1 of the current Anti-Corruption Law, as amended by Law No. 11/15, now distinguishes between attempt and the completed offence. In addition to the perpetrator's intent to grant undue advantages, the completed offence now requires that the offender has actually and effectively granted such advantages in practice. This follows from the legislator's replacement of the expression "with the purpose of granting" in the former text with the term "grants" in the new wording.

Third: The rules of punishment relating to the offence of favoritism

The offence of favoritism in public procurement, like other corruption offences, is governed by specific penal rules introduced by the Anti-Corruption Law in order to deter and repress such crimes. These rules relate mainly to prosecution procedures, sanctions, and other legal provisions, as follows:²

A/ Prosecution: In the context of combating and repressing corruption offences, the Algerian legislator has established special investigative techniques applicable to such offences, including the offence of favoritism, in order to facilitate the collection of evidence pursuant to Article 56, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Corruption Law. These techniques include:

- 1- **Controlled delivery:** This is a procedure allowing suspicious or illicit shipments to exit, pass through, or enter the national territory with the knowledge and under the supervision of the competent authorities, for the purpose of investigation and identifying the perpetrators within the framework of flagrante delicto arrest.³
- 2- **Electronic surveillance:** According to Article 65 bis of the Algerian Code of Criminal Procedure, this is a measure allowing the interception of electronic mail communications.
- 3- **Intrusion or infiltration:** According to Articles 120 and 121 of the Algerian Code of Criminal Procedure, this is a measure carried out upon authorization from the competent judicial authorities (the Public Prosecutor before the opening of a judicial investigation, or the Investigating Judge after its commencement). It allows a judicial police officer or a judicial police officer's assistant acting under the responsibility of the officer in charge of coordinating the operation to monitor individuals suspected of committing a felony or misdemeanour, while

¹ Ahsan Bousquia, op. cit., p. 121.

² See: Article 56 of the Anti-Corruption Law.

³ See: Article 2, paragraph "k" of the Anti-Corruption Law.

pretending to be a participant or accomplice in their activities (i.e., infiltrating the group of suspects).

B/ Applicable penalties and sanctions: This section addresses the principal and supplementary penalties applicable to both natural and legal persons, in addition to aggravating circumstances and grounds for exemption or mitigation of punishment in relation to the offence of favoritism, as follows:

1- Principal penalties

For natural persons: Pursuant to Article 26, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Corruption Law, the offence of favoritism is classified as an aggravated misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment ranging from two months to ten years, and a fine ranging from 200,000 to 1,000,000 Algerian dinars.

For legal persons: Since legal persons cannot be punished under the Penal Code except where expressly provided by law, Article 53 of the Anti-Corruption Law refers, with regard to the criminal liability of legal persons for offences attributed to them, to Article 18 bis of the Penal Code. Accordingly, a legal person found guilty of the offence of favoritism in public procurement is punishable by a fine ranging from 1,000,000 to 5,000,000 Algerian dinars.

2- Supplementary penalties

For natural persons: In addition to optional supplementary penalties provided for under Article 9 of the Penal Code, Article 50 of the Anti-Corruption Law and the mandatory supplementary penalties set out in Article 51 of the same law apply to corruption offences in general, including the offence of favoritism. These penalties are imposed upon conviction and include the following:¹

- **Seizure or freezing:** This concerns criminal proceeds or illicit funds and is ordered by a judicial decision or by the competent authority. It consists of a temporary prohibition on transferring, exchanging, disposing of, or moving assets, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph (h) of the Anti-Corruption Law.
- **Confiscation:** According to Article 2, paragraph (i) of the Anti-Corruption Law, it refers to the permanent deprivation of ownership of criminal proceeds, illicit assets, and unlawful funds by order of a judicial authority, with the transfer of such assets to the ownership of the State, while taking into account the rights of bona fide third parties. It is ordered in case of conviction and also includes the obligation to return the amount or the value of any benefit or profit obtained, even if these assets have been transferred to the ascendants, descendants, siblings, spouse, or in-laws of the convicted person, whether they remain in their original form or have been converted into other assets.
- **Effects of corruption:** Based on Article 55 of the Anti-Corruption Law, and as applied to the offence of favoritism in public procurement, it is clear that the judge is obliged, after delivering a conviction, to determine the advantages granted and their illegality, and to rule within the same criminal judgment (and not in civil proceedings) on the annulment of any contract, public procurement, authorization, advantage, or permit obtained, while respecting the rights of bona fide third parties.

¹ See the provisions of Articles 51 and 55 of the Anti-Corruption Law.

For legal persons: The same supplementary penalties provided for under Article 18 bis of the Algerian Penal Code apply. If a legal person is found guilty of the offence of favoritism, one or more of these supplementary penalties may be imposed.

3- Aggravating circumstances:

Pursuant to Article 48 of the Anti-Corruption Law, the penalty of imprisonment is aggravated (without increasing the fine), and becomes between 10 and 20 years when the offence is committed by: a judge in the broad sense (prosecution, investigation, judgment, enforcement), a senior public official exercising high-level functions of the State, a public officer (notary, judicial officer, auctioneer, official translator), a member of an anti-corruption body, a judicial police officer or assistant, a person exercising certain judicial police powers (such as a mayor), or a court clerk.

4- Exemption from punishment or reduction of sentence

Exemption: Any person who has committed or participated in one or more corruption offences shall be exempt from punishment if, before the initiation of prosecution proceedings, they report the offence to the administrative or judicial authorities or the relevant bodies and assist in identifying the perpetrators, in accordance with Article 49, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Corruption Law.

Reduction: The penalty is reduced by half for any person who has committed or participated in one of the corruption offences and who, after the initiation of prosecution, assists in the arrest of one or more persons involved in its commission, in accordance with Article 49, paragraph 2 of the Anti-Corruption Law.

C/ Other provisions relating to the offence:

This section addresses attempt and complicity, as well as the statute of limitations, as follows:

1- Attempt and complicity in the offence:

- As a general principle, attempt in felonies is punishable with the same penalty as the completed offence, whereas in misdemeanours it is not punishable unless expressly provided by law. However, exceptionally, the Algerian legislator punishes the attempt to commit the offence of favoritism with the same penalty as the completed offence, as is the case for other corruption offences, pursuant to Article 52, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Corruption Law. This may be justified by the fact that these are aggravated misdemeanours that affect the integrity of public office.
- As for complicity in the offence of favoritism and other corruption offences, the general provisions of the Penal Code apply. Accordingly, the accomplice is punished with the same penalty prescribed for the principal offence, pursuant to Article 42 of the Penal Code.

2- Limitation period (prescription):

The public action and the penalty do not prescribe in cases of the offence of favoritism where criminal proceeds have been transferred outside the national territory. In other cases, the general provisions set out in the Algerian Code of Criminal Procedure apply¹, as follows:

¹ See: Article 54 of the Anti-Corruption Law.

With regard to the public action:

Where criminal proceeds remain within the national territory, the limitation period is governed by Article 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since favoritism is classified as a misdemeanour, the public action prescribes after three (3) complete years from the date of commission of the offence.

With regard to the penalty:

Where criminal proceeds remain within the national territory, the penalty is subject to Article 779 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the penalty prescribes after five (5) years from the date on which the judgment or decision becomes final. However, if the custodial sentence imposed exceeds five years as may occur in the offence of favoritism given that it is an aggravated misdemeanour with a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment in the ordinary case, or in the presence of aggravating circumstances then the prescription period equals the length of the sentence imposed, starting from the date on which the judgment becomes final. It should also be noted that the prescription of penalties applies to both types of sanctions, namely imprisonment and fines.

Conclusion

Through this modest study of the offence of favoritism in public procurement under the Anti-Corruption Law, it can be concluded that this offence has no explicit counterpart in the United Nations Convention against Corruption adopted by the UN General Assembly, despite the fact that Algeria was among the first countries to ratify its provisions. Likewise, it is not expressly provided for in the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Rather, it is an offence created and exclusively regulated by the Algerian legislator, which reflects a broadening of the scope of criminalization beyond what is stipulated in international conventions, with the aim of encompassing and suppressing all forms of corruption. The legislator also intervened in 2011 to amend and supplement Article 26 of the Anti-Corruption Law through Law No. 11/15 dated 02/08/2011.

Despite this, various manipulations and deviations in the field of public procurement can still be observed, through the conclusion of suspicious contracts via clear violations or through the selective application of certain criteria for evaluating bids, especially in complex and highly technical procurement procedures. This is further compounded by the lack of adequate training of judges and judicial police officers in the field of public procurement, despite the investigative and repressive mechanisms provided by the Anti-Corruption Law. As a result, sanctions often appear as limited attempts to curb corruption in general, given the practical difficulties in proving such offences due to the fraudulent techniques used by perpetrators to conceal their acts, particularly as they are often experienced individuals holding legal status and positions of influence.

This situation requires not only knowledge of the legal provisions criminalizing the act and the elements of the offence for the purpose of establishing liability, but also a comprehensive understanding of all technical and legal procedures governing the conclusion and execution of public contracts, in order to ensure correct legal qualification of offences, proper determination of criminal responsibility, and effective deterrence of offenders.

Generally speaking, it can be said that legislative and regulatory intervention in the field of public procurement, and the criminalization of the offence of favoritism, has produced tangible results as reflected in practical experience. The Algerian legislator has succeeded in strengthening criminalization, particularly through the 2011 amendment under Law No. 11/15, by replacing the expression “with the purpose of granting” with “grants,” thereby distinguishing between attempt and the completed offence and narrowing the scope for offenders whether principal perpetrators or accomplices in order to enhance deterrence. However, certain shortcomings remain that require further attention to strengthen the repression of this offence, in particular:

- The need for judicial police officers to have sufficient and precise knowledge of all documents constituting public procurement files, in order to establish the existence or absence of the offence.
- The need for judges to have comprehensive knowledge of public procurement rules and procedures and the bodies responsible for them.
- The need to take into account good character and ethics in recruitment, and to reinforce this through both ethical and professional training for those working in the field of public procurement and its administration.

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